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The Normative Source of Kantian
Hypothetical Imperatives
Camillia Kong
Abstract
This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kan-
tian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical
imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical
imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her
reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three rea-
sons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent
Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic
framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of prac-
tical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become
confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the
distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental
choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of
instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative
interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical
imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical effi-
ciency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.
Keywords: instrumental rationality; hypothetical imperatives; pure practical
reasoning; categorical imperative; Kant; Korsgaard; dualism
Kant defines instrumental reason in terms of hypothetical imperatives
which recommend adoption of the means necessary to an agent’s end.
More specifically, he states in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of
Morals that ‘[h]ypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be
practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that
one wills (or that one may will)’.1 According to Kant, hypothetical
imperatives are analytic propositions whereas the categorical imperative
is an a priori, synthetic principle.2
Contemporary commentators often invoke Kant’s theory of hypotheti-
cal imperatives to pinpoint defects within the volitional picture of agency
provided by empiricist conceptions of instrumental reason. Since
Bernard Williams’ seminal paper, ‘Internal and External Reasons’, many
believe that in order for practical reasons to be both normative and
motivational they must be linked to an agent’s existing subjective moti-
vational set.3 For many, the Humean picture of instrumental reason is
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said to best fulfil this internalist requirement, whereas Kant’s account of
practical rationality is rejected on grounds of its supposed endorsement
of external rather than internal reasons. However, in ‘The Normativity
of Instrumental Reason’4 Christine Korsgaard argues that Kantian
principles of practical reason can satisfy the internalist requirement
through Kant’s account of human rational agency. Korsgaard contends
that hypothetical and categorical imperatives share a common normative
source in human rational agency, thus implying the unity of practical
reason. Indeed, the claim is that Kantian hypothetical imperatives
presuppose a kind of moral commitment traditionally associated with the
categorical imperative. This moralized account of instrumental reason
purports to show two things: first, Kantian norms of practical reason are
internal not external reasons; second, this Kantian position as stated
offers an attractive riposte of empiricist models of instrumental reason
and their troubling neutrality towards the moral value of agents’ adopted
ends.
This paper argues that we should not accept Korsgaard’s reading for two
main reasons: first, I argue that the dualism in Kant’s practical philosophy
is necessary for exegetical consistency. Second, defending Kant’s dualistic
framework has normative significance insofar as it prepares for the critical
authority of moral reasoning over and above instrumental rationality.
Ultimately, it is important to revisit Korsgaard’s approach to show that
should her interpretation be accepted, we risk misunderstanding the
distinctive power of the categorical imperative’s constraint on the subjec-
tive, self-regarding focus implicit in the instrumental use of reason. In
defending Kant’s dualism in the practical domain my work finds allegiance
with contemporary critiques of constructivist Kantianism, found in the
work of John Hare, Patrick Kain, and Karl Ameriks.5 These three authors
have correctly argued that both Kant’s metaphysics as well as his dualism
are crucial for an accurate understanding of his practical philosophy.
However, despite my overall sympathy with their non-constructivist read-
ing, my interpretation seeks to defend Kant’s dualistic framework without
the religious connotations endorsed by these three commentators.6
To support my principal arguments, my reading of Kantian hypothetical
imperatives departs from Korsgaard’s interpretation on two major points.
First, instrumental practical reason’s normative source is a combination of
standards of practical efficacy as well as good theoretical cognition.
Aspects of theoretical reason contained in Kantian hypothetical
imperatives have been inadequately explored, in part because the unity of
practical reason tends to be assumed despite its inconsistency with Kant’s
dualistic philosophical framework. Second, prudential or skilful normative
standards of instrumental reason are independent from the categorical
imperative.7 I claim that Kant’s account of desire presupposes rational
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capacities that are not to be confused with rational norms of moral
reasoning.
Sections I and II examine Korsgaard’s reading of Kantian instrumental
reason. I show that her worry about motivational scepticism and related
agent-centred analysis of rational principles incur several exegetical
problems. These include confusing the analytic-synthetic distinction as
well as conflating instrumental and pure practical reason. Sections III
and IV defend Kant’s dualism between moral and instrumental reason
by exposing how norms of empirical and theoretical cognition contribute
to the normativity of instrumental reason. This illustrates how, unlike
moral reasoning, instrumental willing presupposes a stance of openness
and receptivity towards the external world. Section V shows how the use
of instrumental reason towards specific anthropocentric ends leads to a
conflicted dynamic with the objective moral law of pure practical reason.
This supports the claim that principle of moral reason has a critical
authority over and above instrumental reason.
I. Korsgaard’s Reading
According to Kant, the principles of instrumental and moral reason take
an imperatival form. He writes,
All imperatives are expressed by an ‘ought’. By this they mark the
relation of an objective law of reason to a will which is not neces-
sarily determined by this law by virtue of its subjective constitution
(the relation of necessitation). They say that something would be
good to do or to leave undone; only they say it to a will which does
not always do a thing because it has been informed that this is a
good thing to do.8
Rational principles affect human agents through their characteristic
‘oughtness’, necessity, or ‘to-be-doneness’. Both hypothetical and
categorical imperatives share this prescriptive quality. On a conventional
reading, reason’s prescriptivity is explicated with reference to Kant’s
dualistic philosophical system.9 Humans are only imperfectly rational
given our unavoidable sensible features. This means that principles of
practical reason do not in general exercise full control over the human
will. Moreover, Kant stipulates that though all imperatives have practical
necessity, ones of skill and prudence exert only subjective necessity
whereas the categorical imperative has objective necessity. The former
imperatives are applicable to an agent given particular subjective ends,
while the latter imperative pertains to all rational beings irrespective of
their particular subjective ends. Already this signals that the normativity
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of instrumental and moral reason is both different and separate based
on the divergent character of their necessity.
Korsgaard’s interpretation departs from this more traditional reading
in significant respects. Korsgaard contends that moral practical reason
grounds the normativity of instrumental reason.10 She reaches this
conclusion through two interpretive strategies which I explain in more
detail below. First, she focuses on the common practical necessity and
motivational force of the imperatival form; second, she emphasizes how
both hypothetical and categorical imperatives are constitutive of human
autonomous rational agency. At root, Korsgaard hopes to provide a
moralized account of instrumental reason that complements her commit-
ment to a liberal conception of the autonomous agent.
For Korsgaard, Kant’s primary question in the Groundwork is how
any imperative motivates agents to act. Specifically, Korsgaard assumes
that Kant tackles this question from the perspective of one fundamen-
tally concerned about motivational scepticism; his analysis of all impera-
tives – be they of skill, prudence, or morality – allegedly begins from an
inquiry into how normative principles of reason manage to ‘grip’ an
agent. As mentioned above, Bernard Williams’ influential version of
internalism outlines how normative reasons must correspond to an
agent’s subjective motivational set in order to have motivational force.
This set may consist of existing beliefs, desires, or conative components;
independent of these subjective elements normative reasons have no
power to motivate an agent to act. Reasons are normative and have
motivational force not by virtue of their intrinsic ‘rightness’, but because
they become attached to an already existing set of subjective commit-
ments. Internalism therefore appears to solve the problem of reason’s
motivating force and normativity without invoking any metaphysical
frameworks outside the individual agent. But in so doing, Williams
argues that we would need to endorse a Humean – rather than Kantian
– picture of human motivation. Moreover, instrumental rationality would
be the paradigmatic example of motivational internalism since the
existence of such reasons is parasitic on the adoption of a subjective
desiderative end.
Korsgaard accepts the force of the internalist position but she is
further preoccupied with deflecting the charge by some that Kant has an
externalist conception of practical reason.11 Korsgaard argues that
normative principles of Kantian reason have motivational force by virtue
of the necessary constitutive features of practical rational agency itself.
Motivating Korsgaard’s concern with the internalist/externalist debate is
a deeper concern with moral scepticism: if moral principles are presup-
posed in our everyday use of instrumental rationality, moral reasons
then must be both internal and motivating reasons.
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For Korsgaard, to will or be volitionally motivated towards an end
necessarily involves the self-application of rational norms. We are first-
personally committed to an end if we will it; such willing necessarily
involves the ‘inward, volitional act of prescribing the end along with the
means it requires to yourself’.12 In the case of means-end reasoning we
apply the instrumental principle – the rational normative command that ‘if
you will the ends, you must will the means’. In other words, Korsgaard
argues that in addition to subjective volitional commitment, essential to all
practical motivation is the recognition that normative rational principles
apply unconditionally to all agents (as well as oneself).13 To be consistent
with the internalist requirement, Korsgaard believes we subjectively
endorse these normative, rational principles – these principles are internal
rather than external reasons.14
On this account the first-personal endorsement of rational principles
we give to ourselves amounts to a process by which we confer objective
goodness onto a subjective end. This differs from Kant’s own abstract
description of hypothetical imperatives. Other than the recognition that
humans employ instrumental reason towards broad ends involving tech-
nical skill and prudence, Kant remains silent on how individuals define
goodness or value in terms of specific ends. But for Korsgaard to will an
end implies that an individual does not simply desire or will an object,
but actively examines and endorses the substantive value of that end in
accordance with a rational principle, where we can judge this end as a
good thing to will. To support this claim Korsgaard must inject the
instrumental principle with substantive, evaluative content. She states,
‘the normative force of the instrumental principle does seem to depend
on our having a way to say to ourselves of some ends that there are
reasons for them, that they are good’.15
This leads to Korsgaard’s second interpretive strategy. When goodness
is conferred onto an object of our choice, we see how this act of choice
involves our giving ourselves rational principles as relevant laws of
choice and action. We subsequently recognize that what we in fact value
is our rational agency as that through which we determine the object’s
goodness. For Korsgaard the goodness of the means is not analytically
contained within the willing of an end; rather, the search for the means
to an end leads to a regress towards the normative features which are
constitutive of rational agency:
[F]or the instrumental principle to provide you with a reason, you
must think that the fact that you will an end is a reason for the
end. It’s not exactly that there has to be a further reason; it’s just
that you must take the act of your own will to be normative for
you. And of course this cannot mean merely that you are going to
pursue the end. It means that your willing the end gives it a norma-
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tive status for you, that your willing the end in a sense makes it
good. The instrumental principle can only be normative if we take
ourselves to be capable of giving laws to ourselves – or, in Kant’s
own phrase, if we take our own wills to be legislative.16
To summarize, Korsgaard’s argument is as follows: the instrumental princi-
ple articulates how, when we are volitionally committed to an end which
we deem subjectively valuable, we are also committed to the means
towards that end. But this leads us to a further regress from the act of
conferring normative value onto an end to the normativity and value of
self-legislative, autonomous rational agency. In willing the means to our
end we recognize that what we actually normatively endorse is the objec-
tive rational principle which expresses our self-legislating, rational agency.
In the Sources of Normativity Korsgaard inverts the order of this
regress argument:
The hypothetical imperative tells us that if we will an end, we have
a reason to will the means to that end. This imperative […] is not
based on the recognition of a normative fact or truth, but simply
on the nature of the will. To will an end, rather than just wishing
for it or wanting it, is to set yourself to be its cause. And to set
yourself to be its cause is to set yourself to take the available
means to get it. So the argument goes from the nature of the
rational will to a principle which describes a procedure according
to which such a will must operate and from there to an application
of that principle which yields a conclusion about what one has
reason to do.17
Here, Korsgaard begins with an analysis of autonomous agency and
rational will and moves to instrumental reasoning. When one examines
further why we value rational agency, it is because we value our
autonomy and how we as rational agents legislate and create laws for
ourselves. Thus, the means to our ends are normative only insofar as
they reflect the normativity of what it is to be an autonomous rational
agent. Based on how the will functions, rational agents automatically
choose and confer value upon subjectively chosen ends according to the
criteria of objective, self-given laws.18
Regardless of which argumentative strategy she ultimately endorses,
Korsgaard’s analysis of instrumental reason hinges on what she views as
the constitutive features of Kantian rational agency. The nature of rational
agency means that maxims aim to conform to the instrumental principle.19
This is because principles of practical reason ‘do not represent external
restrictions on our actions, whose power to motivate us is therefore inexpli-
cable, but instead describe the procedures involved in autonomous willing’.
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Moreover, ‘they also function as normative or guiding principles, because
in following these procedures we are guiding ourselves’.20 Based on Korsg-
aard’s constitutive account, all practical principles – and therefore both
hypothetical and categorical imperatives – are at once descriptions of the
procedures of our rational agency, as well as prescriptive standards of how
our rational agency should function.
Conventionally, Kantian autonomy is read as identical with the good
will which accords with the moral law.21 Kant writes in the Groundwork:
An absolutely good will, whose principle must be a categorical
imperative, will therefore, being undetermined in respect of all
objects, contain only the form of willing, and that as autonomy. In
other words, the fitness of the maxim of every good will to make
itself a universal law is itself the sole law which the will of every
rational being spontaneously imposes on itself without basing it on
any impulsion or interest.22
If Korsgaard accepts what Kant says here, her claim that the instrumen-
tal principle requires us to ‘give oneself a law’23 must mean that instru-
mental reasoning in fact necessitates individuals to behave in a morally
autonomous sense, typically associated with categorical willing. The
‘mature Kantian view’, writes Korsgaard, ‘traces both instrumental rea-
son and moral reason to a common normative source: the autonomous
self-government of the rational agent’.24 Autonomous self-government
therefore describes and binds all agents, whether their endorsed ends are
moral and objective or instrumental and subjective. If this is true,
instrumental reasons – and more importantly moral reasons – would be
internal reasons that are both normative and motivational since they
reflect how it is to be a being that wills maxims as self-given laws.
Korsgaard’s interpretive analysis of Kantian instrumental reason there-
fore appears capable of responding neatly to both the charge of external-
ism against Kant’s account of practical reason and the threat of moral
scepticism. The constitutive features of unconditioned human autonomy
answer questions surrounding the normative and motivational force com-
mon to both instrumental and moral reasons. Moreover, Korsgaard’s
account of Kantian instrumental reason reflects her general desire to
ground all willing – whether hypothetical or categorical – in the moral
requirements of autonomous rational agency, thus responding to the moral
sceptic. Even when we reason instrumentally, we engage in our capacity
for legislative moral autonomy: on Korsgaard’s account the latter is simply
a constitutive feature of our rational agency in general. It is precisely this
agent-centred focus and regress strategy which allows Korsgaard to claim
that hypothetical imperatives require the legislative demands of the
categorical imperative.
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II. Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
As Korsgaard sees it, the nature of Kantian agency – of the autonomy
which is constitutive of the will – implies that individual maxims are auto-
matically willed as universal law. This suggests that Korsgaard equates the
normativity of all practical reasons with the norms of morality. ‘To say
that moral laws are the laws of autonomy is not to say that our autonomy
somehow requires us to restrict ourselves in accordance with them’,
Korsgaard writes, ‘but rather to say that they are constitutive of autono-
mous action. Kant thinks that in so far as we are autonomous, we just do
will our maxims as universal laws’.25 The categorical imperative is not a
law that we may or may not apply; rather, Korsgaard claims that the
universality requirement of the moral law is contained within all maxim
construction – even in the non-moral pursuit of subjectively desired ends.
If you are a sort of being who acts on maxims, you are therefore a rational
being that always makes, and acts in accordance with, universal moral
law.
At root Korsgaard’s underlying worry about a self-standing principle
of instrumental rationality seems to be the potentially morally indigest-
ible consequences which may follow from it. On the view she wishes to
challenge, a principle of instrumental rationality can function indepen-
dently of the universality requirements of the moral law. To use an
example given by G. A. Cohen, it would be like saying that the Mafioso
who adopts an end to kill someone is in some way committed to carrying
out the means.26 For the sake of consistency, this action would be both
normative and rational; and the Mafioso is not necessarily required to
test their maxim for its moral permissibility. Korsgaard’s moralizing
conclusion tries to avoid these harmful consequences: if all rational
principles lead to the constitutive features of morally autonomous
rational agency, then the Mafioso who adopts this end would automati-
cally will this maxim to kill as universal law, and would be subsequently
required to abandon such an objectionable end.27 Conjoining moral
endorsement of rational principles with subjective volitional commitment
seemingly avoids any extreme detachment of instrumental reason from
moral assessment, and allows these moralized evaluations to be
transferred from the means to the end itself.28
But to address this worry of detachment through Korsgaard’s strategy
does seem problematic for two reasons. First, her reading cannot make
coherent sense of the Groundwork’s analytic-synthetic distinction. This
should indicate that her account of the normative source of instrumental
reason is mistaken. Second, she conflates together prudential and moral
reasoning and therefore reduces the full moral force of the categorical
imperative. The first problem I address in this section, the latter I discuss
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after advancing my own interpretive account of the normative source of
hypothetical imperatives.
Korsgaard’s agent-centred interpretation rests on a generous under-
standing of analyticity. Kant argues that hypothetical imperatives are
analytic,
for in my willing of an object as an effect there is already
conceived the causality of myself as an acting cause – that is, the
use of means; and from the concept of willing an end the impera-
tive merely extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end.29
On a straightforward reading of this passage the means are analytically
contained within willing the end. But Korsgaard adopts a different strat-
egy: she extends the analyticity of hypothetical imperatives to incorporate
the constituents of ‘agency’. She alleges that the constituent features of
rational agency – not the predicate, ‘willing the end’ – perform the analytic
work in Kantian instrumental reason. If we analyse the constituents of
‘rational agency’, we will be able to extract the claim ‘ought to ensure that
if she has an end she takes the necessary means to it’.30 Korsgaard claims
that
[t]o will an end just is to will to cause or realize the end, hence to
will to take the means to the end. This is the sense in which the
[instrumental] principle is analytic. The instrumental principle is
constitutive of an act of the will. If you do no follow it, you are not
willing the end at all.31
In other words, the normativity of instrumental reason relies on what it
means to be an agent who wills rather than what it means to will an end.32
Korsgaard understands the analytic claim, ‘if you will the ends you
necessarily will the means’, to be an essential part of the analysis of
‘rational agent’.33 Following from this analytic truth she suggests that
rational principles – be they instrumental or moral – apply unconditionally
to all agents.
In order for this to make sense we would have to grant Korsgaard a
looser, non-Kantian notion of analytic truth which claims ‘that it is ana-
lytic that any agent ought to do what rational agents do’.34 Korsgaard
seems to have this non-Kantian account in mind, as she writes:
The model suggests that the normativity of the ought expresses a
demand that we should emulate more perfect rational beings (pos-
sibly including our own noumenal selves) whose own conduct is
not guided by normative principles at all, but instead describable in
a set of logical truths.35
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She echoes this thought in Creating the Kingdom of Ends:
[S]ince we still do make choices and have the attitude that what we
choose is good in spite of our incapacity to find the unconditioned
condition of the object’s goodness in this (empirical) regress upon
the conditions, it must be that we are supposing that rational
choice itself makes its object good.36
Thus, it is possible to derive the moral law analytically if we were to
adopt Korsgaard’s conception of analytic truth. If we were to abstract
from the material and conditional nature of hypothetical imperatives, we
would be eventually left with the unconditional form of the categorical
imperative, especially since both are contained within an analysis of the
constitutive features of autonomous rational agency.37 ‘Rationality, as
Kant conceives it’, she writes, ‘is the human plight that gives rise to the
necessity of making free choices – not one of the options which we
might choose or reject’.38
We should be hesitant about adopting Korsgaard’s looser conception of
analytic truth. I take it that Korsgaard’s regress strategy relies on a notion
of analyticity as one of logical entailment. This may cohere with some
remarks Kant makes in the first Critique,39 but it cannot be said to reflect
Kant’s narrower definition of analyticity in the Groundwork. There
analytic truth is defined as strict logical containment: meaning that the
predicate is contained in its subject. ‘Willing an end’ contains the concept
that one ‘ought to will the necessary means’;40 the adoption of an empiri-
cal end entails the means towards that end. More specifically, willing the
means – or a hypothetical imperative – is analytically contained within will-
ing the end. By contrast the categorical imperative is an a priori, synthetic
proposition that is ‘concerned, not with the reason for performing the act
of will, but with the cause which produces the object’.41 Kant’s instrumen-
tal principle is analytic insofar as it applies only if you have adopted an
end; in other words, the applicability of the principle is conditional on that
adopted end. By implication, the instrumental principle acquires its
practical content entirely from the adoption of a desired end, not the
meaning or constituents of agency: without that end, the instrumental
principle would have no evaluative, material, or practical content. And
more importantly, the analyticity of the instrumental principle relies on
one willing an end whether or not its material content is judged good or
bad from the perspective of morality or self-legislating rational agency.
Kant’s main theoretical concern in the Groundwork, and indeed
throughout his practical philosophy, is to show how synthetic principles,
such as the moral law, are possible. This is particularly since the moral law
cannot be derived from any empirical intuition. Kant therefore does not
share Korsgaard’s basic points of departure: it is doubtful that Kant is
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similarly worried about practical reason’s motivational grip on agents, nor
is he preoccupied with disproving moral scepticism.42 By virtue of its con-
ditioned reliance on the empirical world for practical content hypothetical
imperatives are fundamentally less problematic to account for than the
categorical imperative.43 Kant seems to set aside the principle of instru-
mental reason as a straightforward principle which demands no extra
philosophical manoeuvring;44 the brunt of the analytic work is shouldered
by the adoption of a subjectively willed end. Since hypothetical impera-
tives are analytic, instrumental reason must have a conditioned as opposed
to an unconditioned normative source.
III. Theoretical Sources of Instrumental Reason’s Normativity
Korsgaard endorses a wide reading of analyticity because she hopes to
avoid the synthetic a priori. At root this is to evade Kant’s dualistic
framework in his practical philosophy – a common move since Rawls’
dismissal of Kant’s dualisms in A Theory of Justice. 45 However, these
dualisms play a crucial role in Kant’s practical philosophy. To recognize
this we must understand two things: first, that instrumental reason shares
much with theoretical reason; second, moral reasoning must be indepen-
dent from instrumental reason in order to be able to exercise critical
authority over it. We will see this more fully if the theoretically rational
aspects of instrumental reason are explored.
Through his dualisms Kant legitimizes reason in both its theoretical
and practical use and in turn, he carves out a sphere of instrumental prac-
tical reason which is neither pure practical reason nor pure theoretical
cognition, but somewhere in between. For Kant instrumental reason is
‘practical’ in the sense that through its intentionality some kind of change
is produced in the phenomenal world. However, instrumental rationality
is connected more closely to theoretical reason than pure practical reason
in many respects and therefore cannot be conflated with the moral legis-
lation of the latter. Embedded within instrumental desires or impulses
are aspects of theoretical cognition which also form part of the normativi-
ty of instrumental rationality. First, desiderative ends already presuppose
as well as integrate a conceptual grasp of the sensible object in question.
Second, the means-end connection – where human possibility or powers
are evaluated and judged – presupposes the active synthesis of disparate
empirical experience and concepts into laws of nature.
Common among both intellectual components is the use and applica-
tion of theoretical cognition in order to formulate situationally appropriate
principles of practical action. Theoretical reason therefore becomes
‘practical’ when it is animated by the faculty of desire and subsequently
outlines means and ends based on possible experience. In a crucial
passage from the second Critique Kant writes,
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[w]hether the causality of the will is adequate for the reality of the
objects or not is left to the theoretical principles of reason to esti-
mate, this being an investigation into the possibility of objects of
volition, the intuition of which is accordingly no component of the
practical problem.46
This suggests that instrumental reason is theoretical knowledge animated
by impulse or desire, resulting in the generation and execution of
guiding practical rules. As Beck correctly identifies, Kant suggests that
instrumental reason should be understood as ‘theoretical reason which is
only extrinsically and contingently practical’.47 By contrast, the moral
law as an unconditional practical law is discoverable by ‘a reason that is
intrinsically practical’.48
Overall Kantian instrumental reason integrates different elements
from both ancient and modern philosophical traditions. For Aristotle the
irrational parts of the soul are ensconced within a broader rational order;
passional elements thus possess a propensity towards the rational. Desid-
erative and emotional parts of the soul are ‘receptive to reason’ and can
‘participate in reason, in the sense that it is submissive and obedient to
it’.49 By contrast, the modern viewpoint typically detaches inclination
from reason: reason becomes subservient to the dictates of passion or
natural self-preservation. According to this latter picture, human inclina-
tions are unreceptive to rational cognition or instruction. Or in the case
of Hume, these rational capacities become naturalized: practical reason
– its principles and judgements – are rooted in sympathetic or social
propensities instinctive to humans.
For Kant inclinations can never qualify as truly ‘rational’ in the
Aristotelian sense. This is because stringent criteria differentiate moral
practical reason – the purely rational – from non-moral functions of rea-
son (theoretical and instrumental). Human volitional propensities and
their direction through the instrumental use of reason remain rooted in,
receptive to, and conditioned by, the causally governed natural world.
Moreover, the desiderative elements of instrumental rationality have an
uneasy dynamic vis-a`-vis moral reason unlike its relative cooperation in
the Aristotelian soul.
Yet by the same token, the cognitive component to instrumental
reason is not subservient to its conative counterpart as is typical of mod-
ern conceptions of practical reason. The Aristotelian distinction between
animal and human passions can help explain Kant’s point. For Aristotle
the souls of both animals and humans contain an appetitive component
which responds to sensory experience: this is a state of passive receptiv-
ity to the external, sensory world. But unlike animals human passions
incorporate active quasi-judgements or states of mind which direct us
towards specific objects in particular circumstances. Thus, on the one
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hand, human passions are intrinsically receptive: external sensory experi-
ence is required in order to provoke some kind of passional response.50
Yet, on the other hand, intentional action for Aristotle results from a
close interaction of receptive passional and active intellectual features.
Human purposive action therefore results from the modification and
active direction of the passions by the apprehensive capacities of the
intellect. The active input of the intellect is the crucial differentiating
feature between human passions and animal appetite, which dictates
accordingly Aristotle’s functional placement of human essence above
animals on a hierarchical scale of beings in Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.
Like Aristotle’s functional hierarchy, Kant’s dualistic vision of human
nature imposes limits on human beings from below (that of nature and
animals) and above (that of a purely rational, omnipotent being).51 This
dualism also draws upon a distinction between the desires involved in
the instrumentally purposive action of humans and the instinctual
desiring of animals:
That which can be determined by inclination (sensible impulse,
stimulus) would be animal choice (arbitrium brutum). Human
choice, however, is a choice that can indeed be affected but not
determined by impulses, and is therefore of itself (apart from an
acquired proficiency of reason) not pure but can still be determined
to actions by pure will.52
Animals cannot unify their appetitive needs through active thought so as
to achieve a degree of deliberative distance from inclination. By contrast,
human receptivity to sensible phenomena simultaneously provokes the
cognitive capacity for imagination. We necessarily draw upon this capac-
ity of theoretical reason when we desire, will, or choose a particular end
out of the conceptual unity encompassed within the thinking individual.
This cognitive activity introduces a crucial element of human rational
control over inclination absent in animals.53
Kant integrates rational activity into means-end reasoning in two
distinct but related ways. First, Kant has a cognitivist conception of desire;
this is evident in his reference to the concept. In the first Critique the ‘con-
cept’ refers to the active process of thought representation, whereby our
sensible intuitions must conform to the categories of the understanding.
Theoretical knowledge of objects is possible through our sensible receptiv-
ity in relation to only empirically given phenomena.54 The mind is
naturally receptive to empirical data; such data then conforms necessarily
to a priori forms of intuition, space and time. Thus, the ‘concept’ of
phenomenal objects can never extend beyond these conditions; we can
know only appearances, never the essences of things in themselves.
THE NORMATIVE SOURCE OF KANTIAN HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES
673
Kant incorporates this notion of ‘concept’ into his account of the
desiderative faculty: ‘The faculty of desire in accordance with concepts,
insofar as the ground determining it to action lies within itself and not in
its object, is called a faculty to do or to refrain from doing as one
pleases’.55 He states in the Critique of Practical Reason, ‘[g]ood and evil
[are] always appraised by reason and hence through concepts, which can
be universally communicated, not through mere feeling, which is
restricted to individual subjects and their receptivity’.56 Moreover,
[i]f the concept of the good is not to be derived from an antecedent
practical law but, instead, is to serve as its basis, it can be only the
concept of something whose existence promises pleasure and deter-
mines the causality of the subject, that is, the faculty of desire, to
produce it.57
Which representations of objects are subjectively pleasurable cannot be
determined a priori;58 only after experience is accumulated can specific
representations be seen as good in a subjective, hedonistic sense. But
even more fundamentally, the determination of the hedonistically good
and evil itself involves theoretical concepts, judgements or tools which
supplement sensibly given experience and are distinctive to humans.59
Thus, for Kant, bound up with the desiderative faculty is a necessary
conceptual apparatus: reason is always present in inclinations as the lat-
ter cannot even be formed without the prior employment of theoretical
cognition.60
This leads to my second point. Instrumental reason assesses physical
possibilities or constraints in the practical context. Aggregated empirical
experience is utilized to consider how the analytic means-end relationship
can be realized or hindered.61 Indeed, the very notion of experience pre-
supposes this process: human understanding spontaneously apprehends,
associates, recognises, and reproduces sensibly-given appearances in
accordance with a law-like form.62 Means-end rationality cannot function
without theoretical reason’s determination and compilation of disparate
experiential facts into practically usable empirical laws, which may hinder
human desiderative possibilities accordingly. Kant affirms this close
connection between instrumental reason and the understanding in the
second Critique:
Subsumption of an action possible to me in the sensible world
under a pure practical law does not concern the possibility of the
action as an event in the sensible world; for it belongs to the theo-
retical use of reason to appraise that possibility in accordance with
the law of causality, a pure concept of the understanding for which
reason has schema in sensible intuition.63
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In other words, instrumental reason falls partly under the normative
domain of theoretical reason: the understanding generates causal laws
which help determine the physical possibilities of realizing a desired
object. Consequently, it is up to the theoretically rational components
embedded in the desiderative faculty to recognize physical constraints,
ensuring that the means to a desired object – and the object itself – reflect
careful consideration of intervening limits based on one’s understanding
of the natural world. Inclination can therefore have an intermediate, not
immediate, influence on human action; it always involves theoretical
reason’s pre- and post-reflection on possible empirical constraints or
miscellaneous causal connections. The imagination can redirect or deter
an agent’s desire away from a chosen object accordingly in response to
these possible phenomenal restrictions. Indeed, if one fails to respond in
a situationally appropriate way the agent has either an insufficient
awareness of their surroundings or failed to acquire the relevant and
necessary practical experience.
IV. Empirical, not Moral Laws
The discussion so far hints at where I believe Korsgaard’s account goes
astray. The dichotomy implicit in Korsgaard – either instrumental and
pure practical reason must share the same normative source or instru-
mental reason fails to qualify as practical reason at all – ignores Kant’s
subtle inclusion of theoretically rational elements in the faculty of desire.
The first implication of my reading is that Kantian instrumental reason
involves a mixture of theoretically and practically rational components.
Kant confirms this explicitly in the Critique of the Power of Judgement:
For even if the will follows no other principles than those by means
of which the understanding has insight into the possibility of the
object in accordance with them, as mere laws of nature, then
the proposition which contains the possibility of the object through
the causality of the faculty of choice may still be called a practical
proposition, yet it is not at all distinct in principle from the theoreti-
cal propositions concerning the nature of things, but must rather
derive its own content from the latter in order to exhibit the
representation an object in reality. Practical propositions, therefore,
the content of which concerns merely the possibility of a represented
object (through voluntary action), are only applications of a complete
theoretical cognition and cannot constitute a special part of a science.64
Importantly, the will in means-end rationality is marked by a certain
dependency: in these situations the will seeks ends which do not origi-
nate in pure practical reason. Accumulated empirical experiences and
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theoretical knowledge help inform and direct the faculty of desire
towards subjective ends. Ultimately, the fundamental distinction between
the subjection of the will (that of instrumental reason) and the subjec-
tion of nature (that of moral reasoning) lies in whether representations
of desired objects of nature derived by theoretical means, intrude on
practical choice.65
Attention to the theoretical normative source of instrumental reason
brings into sharper relief how in the means-end case Kant is concerned
primarily with empirical – not moral – constraints. The normativity of
instrumental reason is partly constituted by the correct application of
empirical laws – not the moral law of autonomous willing. Although the
means-end relationship will vary depending on the contingently willed
end, the relevant empirical law is nonetheless formally contained within
such willing. As we saw in Section I Korsgaard argues that the
instrumental principle requires making universal law for oneself.66 Yet
this directly contradicts what Kant says in the second Critique:
All practical principles that presuppose an object (matter) of the
faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are, without
exception, empirical and furnish no practical laws. By ‘the matter
of the faculty of desire’ I understand an object whose reality is
desired. Now, when desire for this object precedes the practical
rule and is the condition of its becoming a principle, then I say
(first) that this principle is in that case always empirical.67
For Kant principles of instrumental reason are subjective and contingent;
they depend on its desiderative and empirical components, resulting in a
normative source which is neither pure theoretical nor pure practical
reason.
Instrumental reasons are necessary only after an object has been repre-
sented and its principles can never stand independently of that representa-
tion. Whereas the principle of pure practical reason – the moral law – must
be obeyed even in light of opposing inclinations, hypothetical imperatives
derive their necessity only from the conditional and particular volitional
circumstances and can easily change should inclinations point elsewhere.
Kant writes,
[F]or an action necessary merely in order to achieve an arbitrary
purpose can be considered as in itself contingent, and we can always
escape from the precept if we abandon the purpose; whereas an
unconditioned command does not leave it open to the will to do the
opposite at its discretion and therefore alone carries with it that
necessity which we demand from a law.68
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Principles of instrumental reason reflect the transience of human desidera-
tive needs, as illustrated in cases where the required means to one’s chosen
end proves to be either unpalatable or infeasible to the human agent.69 In
the case of means-end deliberation practical reason can only issue princi-
ples, rules, or recommendations – never laws – because phenomenal
considerations (and thus, theoretical cognitive features) must be given due
weight. Hence why principles of instrumental reason are conceived as
hypothetical imperatives: these come into being only after a represented
object and empirical considerations determine the will.
If I am right about the conditional normative source in the instrumental
use of reason, what follows is a conception of practical necessitation that
is manifestly weaker than, and indeed unlike, the categorical, law-like
demands of moral reason. Korsgaard minimizes this issue of dissimilar
practical necessitation by suggesting that all imperatives share the same
prescriptive ‘oughtness’. However, Kant states explicitly that, as depen-
dent on the phenomenal world the ‘oughtness’ of hypothetical imperatives
represents the subjective necessity of the will unlike the objective necessity
of the categorical imperative. Instrumental choice must apply and con-
sider the causality of those empirical laws generated by the understanding;
by implication, hypothetical imperatives are principles that can only
recommend, not categorically demand, the appropriate practical action to
the will.70 Even the terms Kant uses to describe the different principles of
practical reason express their dissimilar necessitation. The practical princi-
ples that guide us towards instrumental reason’s ends of technical skill
and happiness, he classifies as ‘rules of skill or counsels of prudence’;71
both are ‘principles of the will’72 as opposed to the unconditioned and
objective ‘commands (laws) of morality’.73
Kant’s discussion of the heteronomous will helps clarify this point. In
a lengthy passage from the Groundwork Kant explains how represented,
desired objects combine with empirical laws of nature to determine the
heteronomous will:
Wherever the object determines the will – whether by means of
inclination, as in the principle of personal happiness, or by means of
reason directed to objects of our possible volitions generally, as in
the principle of perfection – the will never determines itself immedi-
ately by the thought of an action, but only by the impulsion which
the anticipated effect of the action exercises on the will: ‘I ought to
do something because I will something else.’ And the basis for this
must be yet a further law in me as a subject, whereby I necessarily
will this ‘something else’ – which law, in turn requires an imperative
to impose limits on this maxim. The impulsion supposed to be
exercised on the will of the subject, in accordance with his natural
constitution, by the idea of a result to be attained by his own powers
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belongs to the nature of the subject – whether to his sensibility (his
inclinations and taste) or to his understanding and reason, whose
operation on an object is accompanied by satisfaction in virtue of
the special equipment of their nature – and consequently, speaking
strictly, it is nature which would make the law. This law, as a law of
nature, not only must be known and proved by experience and
therefore is in itself contingent and consequently unfitted to serve
as an apodeictic rule of action such as a moral rule must be, but it is
always merely heteronomy of the will: the will does not give itself
the law, but an alien impulsion does so through the medium of the
subject’s own nature as tuned for its reception.74
Kant suggests that the normative principle of instrumental reason can be
partly sourced in the theoretical laws of nature; more emphatically, this
principle does not entail the moral law. In this case the ‘will is subject’ to
the laws of nature, as opposed to ‘a nature which is subject to a will’ for
‘in the former the objects must be the causes of the representations that
determine the will’.75 When Kant argues that the instrumental use of
reason presupposes a conception of oneself as an acting cause, he is not
arguing that all practical agency stems from the pure autonomous and
moral will [Wille]. Rather the will as free choice [Willku¨r] functions as
the efficient cause to practical action. By ‘efficient cause’ Kant means
that we actively see how our free choice [Willku¨r] is connected to desid-
erative ends within a causal, means-end connection; we have ascertained
the will’s adequacy to effect change in the phenomenal world as
informed by a combination of empirical knowledge and desiderative
conditions.
Yet the will conceived of as an ‘efficient cause’ does not obliterate
human agency in any way. As argued so far, the human understanding
actively collates particular ideas/concepts into a law-like form. This is
applicable to the practical context because reflecting on the causal possi-
bilities towards a desired end reveals ‘a further law in me as a subject’.
Particularly in the case of morally indifferent actions reason alerts us that
we must apply another law which regulates part of our dual nature – as
sensibly driven, imperfectly rational beings who are open to, and function
within, a natural, mechanistic environment.76 Both laws of nature and the
moral law are practically relevant to the human agent since both
correspond and apply to different aspects of humanity’s dual constitution.
By implication, through the very recognition of which law is salient and
applicable to the particular circumstance individuals demonstrate a
deliberative, spontaneous component which, on the one hand, progresses
beyond the instinctual, unreflective activity of animals, and on the other,
is bound and limited by the inescapable experience of human rational
contingency.
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Thus Korsgaard is partly right to say that when one actively chooses
[Willku¨r] an end in the instrumental use of reason one does indeed apply
a law to oneself – but crucially this refers not to the moral law of
autonomous willing, but to theoretically informed principles which
become practical by virtue of their attachment to an end set by the fac-
ulty of desire. From the vantage point of humanity’s partially sensible
nature, the causal laws of nature are perfectly valid; from the viewpoint
of our intelligible, noumenal counterpart, these empirical laws are
merely impure practical rules or recommendations owing to their
inherent reliance on phenomenal nature to fulfil our subjective desires.
Hypothetical imperatives of instrumental reason are therefore norma-
tive insofar that they appeal to the sensible, empirical side of humanity’s
imperfectly rational constitution. Kant confirms this point explicitly in
the second Critique:
The human being is a being with needs insofar as he belongs to the
sensible world, and to this extent his reason certainly has a
commission from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse,
to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with a view
to happiness in this life and, where possible, in a future life as well.
But he is nevertheless not so completely an animal as to be
indifferent to all that reason says on its own and to use reason
merely as a tool for the satisfaction of his needs as a sensible being.
For, that he has reason does not at all raise him in worth above
mere animality if reason is to serve him only for the sake of what
instinct accomplishes for animals; reason would in that case be only
a particular mode nature had used to equip the human being with
the same end to which it has destined animals, without destining
him to a higher end. No doubt once this arrangement of nature has
been made for him he needs reason in order to take into consider-
ation at all times his well-being and woe.77
Norms of instrumental reason possess a motivational hold over agents
because ends of skill and happiness are ones that humans naturally seek;
it appeals to the sensible part of our human constitution. Their normative
authority is not constitutive of the purely rational part of human nature,
but is derived from how we function as partly rational, partly sensible
beings that are situated within phenomenal conditions.
Thus, we can see how Kant answers Williams’ concerns about the
motivational grip of hypothetical imperatives without appealing to a
conception of autonomous rational agency as suggested by Korsgaard.78
Instrumental reasons have a motivational ‘grip’ on the desiderative
components which are expressive of our sensible as well as practically
rational nature. Kant subsequently implies that, in cases where those
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practical principles fail to convince the rational part of the human agent,
their appeal to our sensible/desiderative side would ultimately compen-
sate.79 We can see that the opposite also holds: reason can contribute to
our natural, sensible interest in human well-being and happiness, and
can help determine its empirical constituents for particular agents.
This shows that theoretically rational components in instrumental
choice or desire are generated without appeal to the categorical impera-
tive.80 Contra Korsgaard’s account, the normativity of instrumental
reason relies upon the active conceptualization and practical application
of causal empirical laws in order to, first, link a desired end (represented
object) with the necessary means, and second, ascertain whether or not
this theoretical connection is practically realisable. Moreover, if moral
autonomy is taken as constitutive of all human rational agency, we fail
to capture how theoretical normative sources of instrumental reason
express a stance of openness and receptivity to the natural world which
can in turn influence human purposive action.
V. The Dialectical Nature of Practical Reason
Central to Kant’s dualism between instrumental and moral reason is a
conflicted dynamic between universal morality and the individual pursuit
of desire or contingently determined interests. The particularistic
application of instrumental reason frequently opposes the universality of
the categorical imperative. This open-ended oscillation between the sub-
jective and objective lies at the heart of the humanistic use of both spheres
of practical reason. Kant therefore affirms two separate and legitimate but
discordant spheres of human agency in alignment with our dual features.
The predisposition of humanity and hypothetical imperatives are closely
linked: such requirements correspond to ends which are characteristic of
dualistic, rational imperfect beings, such as skill and happiness.81 Subjec-
tive ends of instrumental reason are rooted in the natural world, vary
arbitrarily between individuals, and therefore cannot be the basis for a
conception of universal morality. Kant assumes a close connection
between phenomenal experience, hedonistic inclination, and the end of
happiness to justify his argument. He writes:
Only experience can teach what brings us joy. Only the natural
drives for food, sex, rest, and movement, and (as our natural pre-
dispositions develop) for honor, for enlarging our cognition, and so
forth, can tell each of us, and each only in his particular way, in
what he will find those jobs; and, in the same way, only experience
can teach him the means by which to seek them. All apparently a
priori reasoning about this comes down to nothing but experience
raised by induction to generality, a generality […] will be so
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tenuous that everyone must be allowed countless exceptions in
order to adapt his choice of a way of life to his particular inclina-
tions and his susceptibility to satisfaction and still, in the end, to
become prudent only from his own or others’ misfortunes.82
For Kant we can never shed our empirical selves: given our dualistic
constitution part of us will always be rooted within the phenomenal
world and be interested in our prudential happiness. We need to be
receptive to sensibly-given intuitions in order to know what particular
inclinations successfully promote our pragmatic interests in happiness;
we accumulate subjective prudential experience through the exploration
of what desires promote pleasure and satisfaction. Skilful or prudential
ends – and our motivation towards them – are not moral in Kant’s
restricted definition of the term. Despite their non-moral status, these
ends are nonetheless necessary for the kind of desiring and partially sen-
sible beings we are.
Instrumental reasoning – including its constituents, application, and
purpose – must therefore be an exclusively anthropocentric exercise, par-
ticularly since a perfectly rational being is incapable of willing contrary
to the moral law. The word ‘subjective’ has two connotations for Kant:
the more straightforward reading suggests a variety of individualized
ends but on a deeper level the term stands for the predisposition of
humanity in general, characterized by the limited rational capacities
which set us apart from divine, non-desiderative beings. In itself the the-
oretically rational aspects to human desire – the rational capacity to
aggregate disparate empirical experiences into the form of law – is ‘sub-
jective’ since this form of cognition is necessary only to the human
understanding. Moreover, the pragmatic interests which are constitutive
of the instrumental use of reason already suggest that a perfectly
rational, non-appetitive being (such as God) would never need to use
reason in such a way. Consider what Kant states in his lectures on philo-
sophical theology, dated 1783–4:
Holiness is the absolute or unlimited moral perfection of the will. A
holy being must not be affected with the least inclination contrary
to morality. It must be impossible for it to will something which is
contrary to moral laws. So understood, no being but God is holy.
For every creature always has some needs, and if it wills to satisfy
them, it also has inclinations which do not always agree with moral-
ity. […] For every creature has needs which limit its inclination to
make others happy; or at least these needs limit its ability to make
such use of these inclinations that it may have not regard at all for
its own welfare. But God is independent benevolence. He is not
limited by any subjective ground, because he himself has no needs.83
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The anthropocentricity of instrumental reason is further supported by
Kant’s discussion of the human predisposition in the Religion. In describ-
ing this predisposition Kant states in a footnote that an individual
might apply the most rational reflection to these objects [of choice] –
about what concerns their greatest sum as well as the means for
attaining the goal determined through them – without thereby even
suspecting the possibility of such a thing as the absolutely imperative
moral law which announces to be itself an incentive, and, indeed, the
highest incentive.84
This passage directly contradicts Korsgaard’s regress strategy. Kant
claims that the human agent can be engaged in means-end deliberation
in isolation of the moral law and indeed, she may not be even practically
cognisant of its normativity. Even more strongly put, the distinction
between heteronomy and autonomy signals that Kant believes that an
agent can choose contrary to the categorical imperative, adopting instead
a lesser, non-moral good rooted in empirical grounds of determination.
We can choose and pursue an end that is recognisably bad, even though
we may acknowledge that there is a better end that we ought to endorse
according to the criteria of morality – and this would still qualify as
instrumentally rational.
The end of happiness fits this description of heteronomous willing: it is
classified as a ‘subjective’ end because Kant rejects a conception of moral-
ity that is defined strictly in anthropocentric terms. Kant criticizes Greek
eudaimonistic theories because he believes that proponents of these theo-
ries confuse prudential self-regard with the objective end of morality.85
Self-love and individual inclinations are made the basis of morality – or in
Kant’s words, ‘subjective determining grounds of choice [become] the
objective determining ground of the will’.86 The prudential interests we
pursue through the instrumental use of reason often divert us away from
the true end of morality. Indeed, we often put our happiness before our
moral duty; we prioritize the instrumental use of reason over our moral
reason, and this leads to a dialectical relationship between the two forms
of reason:
Man feels in himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands
of duty presented to him by reason as so worthy of esteem – the
counterweight of his needs and inclinations, whose total satisfaction
he grasps under the name of ‘happiness’. But reason, without
promising anything to inclination, enjoins its commands relent-
lessly, and therefore, so to speak, with disregard and neglect of
these turbulent and seemingly equitable claims (which refuse to be
suppressed by any command). From this there arises a natural
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dialectic – that is, a disposition to quibble with these strict laws of
duty, to throw doubt on their validity or at least on their purity
and strictness, and to make them, where possible, more adapted to
our wishes and inclinations; that is, to pervert their very founda-
tions and destroy their whole dignity – a result which in the end
even ordinary human reason is unable to approve.87
Another way to understand this is to say that our instrumental reason
directs us towards certain natural ends, but in doing so we are aware of
how our conditional pursuit of happiness falls short of the moral
demand.88 On one hand happiness is a necessary end to us as humans:
this close connection between instrumental reason and the predisposition
of humanity is evident in the similar language Kant uses to describe
both. Inclinations towards ‘self love which is physical’ exemplify the pre-
disposition of humanity: both the human predisposition and the instru-
mental use of reason have an acquisitive, self-interested inflection and
together, both depict the divisiveness, comparison, and multiplicity of
ends among anthropomorphic beings.89 For something to be ‘objective’
in Kant’s sense it has to apply universally to all rational beings;90 a pri-
ori, universal principles are laws which are valid for all rational beings
without exception. And as the earlier quotation shows, a divine being
has no subjective needs or impulses.
All of this appears to point to an irresolvable dialectic within practical
reason: given our dualistic constitution humans inevitably seek happiness
through hypothetical willing, yet this pursuit is wrought with ills and is
inappropriate to our predisposition of moral personality. It is therefore
entirely possible – and in fact a distinctly human characteristic – to use rea-
son in a way that is contrary to the moral law. In contrast to Korsgaard’s
cooperative picture, Kant paints a much more antagonistic relationship
between instrumental and moral reasoning. This dialectic is important: in
experiencing this tension Kant believes that individuals eventually come to
recognize the need to constrain the egoistic, subjectivist tendencies which
characterize the instrumental use of reason. It is precisely this notion of
moral constraint that is lost once the normativity of hypothetical impera-
tives and the categorical imperative are conflated.
Conclusion
Some contemporary Kantians might object to my reading of Kantian
instrumental reason on two grounds. First, one might be tempted to say
that my interpretation of Kant is too Humean: emphasis on the theoreti-
cally rational aspects of the normativity of instrumental reason seems
too similar to an empiricist belief-desire model of practical motivation.
However, this worry is sidestepped once we fully understand how Kant
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adopts a cognitivist conception of desire. Above I have highlighted how
desire for Kant involves close interaction between passive reception of
sensory experience and the active formation of rational concepts. It is
not simply the case that means-end deliberation will involve some kind
of belief and some kind of desire – the actual desiderative faculty
involves a large degree of rational activity in a theoretical sense.
But while Kant departs from an empiricist model, it is important to
note that the normativity of hypothetical imperatives does not necessitate
moral assessment. This fact highlights an aspect to Kantian instrumental
reason which is neglected in contemporary interpretations: namely
Kant’s acknowledgement that a stance of openness and receptivity to the
phenomenal world is a requisite for successful practical action. Kant is
frequently accused of legitimizing the ‘degrad[ation of] nature and the
world into mere means’91 based on the fact that the moral demand is
strictly non-empirically rooted. But if we consider carefully how instru-
mental reason is important in its own right, it seems that Kant acknowl-
edges how part and parcel of the human condition is to be receptive to,
affected by, as well as engaged with, the natural world.
Finally, one might object that embracing Kant’s dualisms results in a
rather ominous gulf between the normativity of hypothetical imperatives
and the categorical imperative. On this view, to read practical reason
through the lens of Kant’s dualisms weakens the overall coherence of his
moral philosophy. No material content appears capable of bridging this
interminable gulf between our intelligible and sensible natures and their
divergent practical manifestations. One strategy would be to go along
the interpretive path outlined by Korsgaard: practical reason is unified if
the normative source of both instrumental and moral reason is founded
on human capacities for creative self-legislating rational agency. Based
on its common normative source, both instrumental and pure practical
reason interact in an unproblematic and cooperative manner towards
individual happiness. In turn, a degree of practical coherence is
conferred onto Kant’s overall theory.
Though this objection has some force, ultimately such coherence is
purchased at a large philosophical cost – namely at the expense of a
moral framework which can restrict or critique instrumental reason.
Korsgaard’s account is in danger of collapsing morality into instrumental
reason. The normativity of the moral law becomes too closely connected
to prudential or technical considerations. This leads to misleading con-
clusions about the necessity of hypothetical imperatives: the subjective
necessity of these imperatives is indistinguishable from the objective
necessity of the moral law. The moral subtlety of Kant’s dualisms is
therefore lost.
Thus, two important implications emerge out of my interpretive claim
that instrumental reason shares much with theoretical reason. First, it
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highlights a neglected dimension of instrumental reason: namely how the
latter presupposes and requires a stance of openness towards the external
world. This not only deflects accusations that Kant’s practical philosophy
leads to the wholesale devaluation of the natural environment, but also
has significance in his political philosophy.92 Second, it helps prepare for
the critical authority of moral reason. Pure practical reason functions as a
moral constraint on the potentially unfettered subjective interests of
human instrumental reasoning. Understanding Kant’s dualism between
instrumental and pure practical reason helps us better appreciate his
insight that moral reasoning fulfils a vital critical role in relation to
human empirical interests.93
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God’s Commands’, Faith and Philosophy, 17 (2000), pp. 487–505. That said,
Kant’s notion of the highest good and the postulates of pure practical reason
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7 Patrick Kain, ‘Prudential Reason in Kant’s Anthropology’, in Brian Jacobs
and Patrick Kain (eds) Essays on Kant’s Anthropology (Cambridge: Cam-
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83 (1986), pp. 10–11, in particular her rejection of Frankena’s reading of
Kant. See William Frankena, ‘Obligation and Morality in Recent Moral Phi-
losophy’, in Kenneth Goodpaster (ed.) Perspectives on Morality: Essays by
William Frankena (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1977), p. 63.
12 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 245.
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Philosophers’ Imprint, 1 (2001), p. 7.
14 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 247. See Mark Schroeder, ‘The Hypothetical
Imperative’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83 (2005), p. 358.
15 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 251.
16 Ibid., pp. 245–6.
17 Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), p. 36.
18 Jens Timmermann, ‘Value Without Regress: Kant’s “Formula of Humanity”
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19 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 244.
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21 Timmermann, Commentary, pp. 15–21; also Lewis White Beck, A Commen-
tary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1960), pp. 37–40.
22 G 444 (95).
23 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 245.
24 Ibid., p. 220.
25 Ibid., p. 249, third emphasis added.
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27 Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, pp. 256–8.
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31 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 244.
32 Schroeder, ‘Hypothetical Imperative’, p. 363.
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34 Ibid., p. 365.
35 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 240, emphasis added.
36 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), p. 122.
37 Schroeder, ‘Hypothetical Imperative’, p. 361.
38 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 244.
39 See Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) (hereinafter KrV),
A6-7, which reveals a notion of analyticity which includes logical containment
as well as loose analyticity or entailment. I thank Alison Mallard for bringing
my attention to this passage from the First Critique.
40 Schroeder, ‘Hypothetical Imperative’, p. 365.
41 G 417 (45).
42 The main thrust of Korsgaard’s problem fails to have any resonance with
Kant, since the paradigm operating during and prior to his time presumed
that the interplay of cognitive and conative dimensions within instrumental
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43 Schroeder, ‘Hypothetical Imperative’, p. 362.
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cussion’ [G 417 (44)].
45 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: Bel-
knap Press, 1999), pp. 226–7.
46 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason), trans. Mary
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) (hereinafter KpV),
Ak 5: 45, emphases added.
47 Beck, Commentary, p. 40.
48 Ibid.
49 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson (London: Penguin,
2004), 1102b15, 1102b31033.
50 See Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), pp. 41–2.
51 These delimitations are not concrete but fluid, as Kant’s teleology claims that
humanity is constantly progressing towards the ideal of perfect morality.
Thus, limitations stemming from human dualism change as humanity grow in
rationality and morality.
52 Der Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysic of Morals), trans. and ed. Mary
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) (hereinafter MS), Ak
6: 214.
53 For example, Kant writes a footnote in the Anthropologie in pragmatischer
Hinsicht (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. 1st ed. 1798; 2nd ed.
1800), trans. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006): ‘The irrational animal <perhaps> has something similar to what we call
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sentations in the human being), but which may perhaps be entirely different
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resentation with consciousness of action whereby the representations relate
to a given object and this relation may be thought’ (7: 141, n24, Prussian
Academy pagination).
54 KrV A156/B156.
55 MS 6: 214.
56 KpV 5: 58.
57 Ibid.
58 Importantly, although the representations themselves are not subjectively
constituted, the relation between pleasure and pain sensations and their rep-
resentations are. The subjective relation is a crucial point that will be elabo-
rated on below to reject the collapse between subjective and objective
reasons in Korsgaard’s interpretation.
59 KpV 5: 61.
60 Richard Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason; On the Moral Foundation
of Kant’s Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p.
186, n10. To understand the function of the imagination involves a discussion
of the ‘I’ of apperception but it goes beyond the scope of what I want to
claim here. For more on the transcendental unity of imagination and the ‘I’
of apperception, see KrV A 121–5.
61 See G 444 (93–5).
62 That the understanding is a presupposition in the relevant empirical laws in
means-end reasoning is further confirmed in the following: ‘[t]o make system-
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atic the unity of all possible empirical actions of the understanding is a busi-
ness of reason, just as the understanding connects the manifold of appear-
ances through concepts and brings it under empirical laws’ (KrV A665/B693).
See also KrV A124–5, A643/B471–A644/B672.
63 KpV 5: 68, third emphasis added.
64 Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of the Power of Judgment), trans. Paul Guyer
and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Ak 20:
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66 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 246.
67 KpV 5: 21, second emphasis added.
68 G 420 (59).
69 Here there is a clear difference between Kant and Korsgaard, as the latter
claims in ‘Normativity’, p. 250: ‘If I am to will an end, to be and to remain
committed to it even in the face of desires that would distract and weak-
nesses that would dissuade me, it looks as if I must have something to say to
myself about why I am doing that [...] It looks as if the end is one that has to
be good, in some sense that goes beyond the locally desirable’. I am very
doubtful that Kant would expect the same level of ‘commitment’ in instru-
mental reason, particularly if the desire for the end disappears or is redi-
rected elsewhere.
70 G 414 (47).
71 G 416 (44).
72 G 420 (59).
73 G 416 (44). Also KpV 5: 20: ‘The first would be hypothetical imperatives and
would contain mere precepts of skill; the second, on the contrary, would be
categorical and would alone be practical laws. Thus, maxims are indeed prin-
ciples but not imperatives. But imperatives themselves, when they are condi-
tional – that is, when they do not determine the will simply as will but only
with respect to a desired effect, that is, when they are hypothetical impera-
tives – are indeed practical precepts but not laws’. Kant also refers to hypo-
thetical imperatives as pragmatic imperatives, and in his lectures on ethics
(C. C. Mongrovius notes) dating from roughly around the same period of the
Groundwork (1784) he states, ‘[t]he moral imperative is opposed to the prag-
matic, and commands in a different way. Pragmatic and moral imperatives
are very often confounded with one another, which happens not only among
the ancients, but also even nowadays among the moderns, though the two
things are poles apart. Pragmatic imperatives are merely counsels; moral
imperatives either motiva, rules of virtue, or leges, juridical laws’. Kant’s Lec-
ture on Ethics, Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind (eds) trans. Peter Heath
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 29: 610 (Prussian Academy
pagination).
74 G 444 (93–5), third emphasis added.
75 KpV 5: 44.
76 KpV 5: 6n.
77 KpV5: 61–2.
78 That said, my view of Kantian instrumental reason appears to accommodate
a compatibilist conception of practical freedom.
79 An evident example is simply when the means-ends connection fails to be
practically enacted because the desire for the object changes or altogether
dissipates.
80 Korsgaard, ‘Normativity’, p. 244.
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81 Thus, Kant’s account does not discount the possibility that non-human
rational beings engage in hypothetical willing, provided that they share the
dualistic constitutions of human beings. That said, Kant’s discussion of predis-
positions in the Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft
(Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. Allen Wood and
George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (herein-
after R), Ak 6: 26–7, suggests that the formation of hypothetical imperatives
and instrumental reasoning are characteristically human exercises of reason.
82 MS 6: 215–6.
83 Lectures on Philosophical Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and Gertrude
M. Clark (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 114, final emphasis added
84 R Ak 6: 26n, emphasis added.
85 This applies especially to his critique of Epicureans. But his account of Stoic
happiness is criticized on slightly different grounds. I am not going to
engage with the issue of whether or not Kant was indeed justified in his
criticisms of Greek eudaimonistic theories. For a critical examination of this
issue, see T. H. Irwin, ‘Kant’s Criticisms of Eudaemonism’, in Stephen Eng-
strom and Jennifer Whiting (eds) Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking
Happiness and Duty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
86 KpV 5: 74.
87 G 405 (23).
88 KpV 5: 119.
89 R 6: 27.
90 G 421 (51).
91 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958), p. 158.
92 For instance, it sheds some light on how we should understand Kant’s
property argument in his political philosophy.
93 I am grateful to Katrin Flikschuh and Adrian Moore for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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